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Learner autonomy- the first language/second 
language: some reflections on the nature and role 
of metalinguistic knowledge. I 
Introduction 
Learner autonomy is classically defined as "the 
ability to take charge of one's learning" (Holec 1981:3). 
Such an ability presupposes a positive attitude towards 
the process, content and goals of learning, and is 
sustained and strengthened by a developing capacity 
for "detachment, critical reflection, decision-making, 
and independent action" (little 1991:4). The freedom 
that characterizes the autonomous learner is not 
absolute, but conditional and constrained. Learning, 
whether developmental/ experiential or formal, is 
always embedded in an interactive, social process (self-
instruction entails an internalization of this process, so 
that our capacity for learning on our own develops out 
of our experience of learning in interaction with others; 
cf. Uttle 1991:5). This explains the paradox that learner 
autonomy can be fully understood as a theoretical 
construct and effectively pursued as a pedagogical goal 
only when we take full account of the social context 
in which learning takes place. 
The argument in favour of fostering learner 
autonomy has been conducted in both social and 
psychological terms. In adult education, for 
example, there has been a tendency to stress "the 
need to develop the individual's freedom by 
developing those abilities which will enable him to 
act more responsibly in running the affairs of the 
society in which he lives" (Holec 1981:1.). The link 
between educational purpose and political ideal could 
scarcely be plainer. Other explorations of the theory 
and practice of learner autonomy, by contrast, have 
focussed on the psychological dimension of learning, 
emphasizing that we can only ever learn on the basis of 
what we already know, and that no two individuals 
have exactly the same store of knowledge. Barnes 
(1976:23), for instance, makes this point by appealing to 
Kelly's (1963) psychology of personal constructs: 
The universe [ ... ] is open to piecemeal 
interpretation. Different men contrue it in 
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different ways. Since it owes no prior allegiance 
to any one man's construction system, it is 
always open to reconstruction. Some of the 
alternative ways of construing are better 
adapted to man's purpose than others. 
Thus, man comes to understand his world 
through an infinite series of successive 
approximations. [ ... ] 
Life is characterized[ ... ] by the capacity of 
the living thing to represent its environment. 
Especially is this true of man, who builds 
construction systems through which to view the 
world. 
(Kelly 1963:43) 
Barnes' s point is that learning in formal con texts 
depends on communication, but communication will 
be effective only to the extent that it takes account of the 
personal constructs of each participant in the learning 
dialogue. This argument has clear implications for 
power relationships in the classroom and demonstrates 
the ultimate impossibility of separating the 
psychological from the social dimension of learning 
both generally and in the theory and practice of learner 
autonomy. 
In the case of second and foreign language 
learning, the interaction of the social and psychological 
dimensions is central to our understanding of the 
language learning process and the means by which it is 
most effectively promoted. It is now widely accepted 
that proficiency in a second or foreign language -
understood as a capacity for spontaneous language use 
- is developed procedurally, by using the target 
language as a medium of communication (see, for 
example, Bialystok and Hakuta 1994:158); thus if 
instructed language learners are to achieve a specified 
level of proficiency, their learning must be firmly 
embedded in the performance of appropriate target 
language tasks. This has clear implications for the 
organization of their learning as social process. At 
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the same time, however, language learning in formal 
contexts is inevitably an intentional process shaped by 
various analytical procedures which depend on but 
also produce various kinds of analytical knowledge. 
The capacity for critical reflection and analysis on 
which I have suggested learner autonomy partly 
depends, develops in interaction with these analytical 
procedures and analytical knowledge, including 
metalinguistic knowledge. 
Metalinguistic knowledge, defined as 
knowledge about the structures, functions, and 
processes of language, is the central concern of this 
article. My purpose is theoretical rather than practical: 
not to offer detailed guidelines for pedagogical 
practice, but to sketch a framework within which such 
guidelines might be elaborated. I am particularly 
concerned to explore the origin and nature of 
rnetalinguistic knowledge and the role it plays not only 
in second I foreign language learning but also in mother 
tongue education. I begin by suggesting that the 
development of metalinguistic knowledge is an 
integral part of first language acquisition, and I 
distinguish two sources of metalinguistic knowledge, 
one internal and the other external to the learner. Next 
I discuss the relation between metalinguistic 
knowledge and theacquisitionofliteracyin themother 
tongue. And finally I focus on the role played by 
metalinguistic knowledge in second/foreign language 
learning, with particular reference to the interaction 
between the development of mother tongue literacy 
and second/foreign language learning. 
The development of metalinguistic knowledge as 
part of first language acquisition 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992:31) proposes that there 
is a fundamental difference between human and 
non-human intelligence: 
Unlike the spider, which stops at web 
weaving, the human child - and, I maintain, 
only the human child -has the potential to take 
its own representations as objects of cognitive 
attention. Normally developing children not 
only become efficient users of language; 
they also spontaneously become little 
grammarians. 
In other words, humans "spontaneously go 
beyond successful behaviour", so that normally 
developing children "are not content with using the 
right words and structures; they go beyond expert 
usage to exploit the knowledge that they have already 
stored" (ibid., p. 32). Karmiloff-Smith argues that 
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what makes this possible is a repeated process of 
"representational redescription" (ibid.), which she 
defines as "a process by which implicit information 
in the mind subsequently becomes explicit knowledge 
to the mind" (ibid., p. 18). 
Karmiloff-Smith's model of representational 
redescription posits four levels at which knowledge is 
represented and re-represented. She labels these 
Implicit, Explicit-1, Explicit-2, and Explicit-3 
(1992:20). At the Implicit level, information is encoded 
in procedural form and new representations are 
independently stored. In first language acquisition, 
Implicit level knowledge underpins language use that 
is context-bound and relatively inflexible. At Explicit-I 
level, representations are "reduced descriptions that 
lose many of the details of the procedurally encoded 
information" (ibid., p. 21) but as a consequence become 
more cognitively flexible. As an example Karmiloff-
Smith offers the redescription of "zebra" into "striped 
animal", which makes possible the analogy between an 
actual zebra and a zebra (pedestrian) crossing. 
Although Explicit-1level representations are available 
to the cognitive system as data, they are not available 
to conscious access and verbal report (ibid., p. 22). 
At Explicit-2 level, representations are accessible to 
consciousness but not ·to verbal report, whereas at 
Explicit-3 level, representations are accessible to both 
consciousness and verbal report. 
By proposing more than two levels of 
representations, Karmiloff-Smith is arguing against a 
dichotomous relation between procedural and 
declarative knowledge- and it should be noted that in 
her model, mature humans possess knowledge at all 
levels. She is also arguing that metalinguistic 
knowledge can be both unconscious and conscious-
unconscious in the example of the four-year-old 
child who pointed to a typewriter and said to her 
mother: ''You're the typewriter, that's a typewrite" 
(Karmiloff-Smith 1992:31); conscious and verbalizable 
in the example of the ten-year-old who explained that 
he said 
"my watch" because it belongs to me, but 
I said: "you hid the watch" because there are no 
other watches there. H you'd put yours out, I 
would have had to say "you hid my watch", 
because it could have been confusing, but this 
way it's better for me to say "you hid the watch" 
so someone doesn't think yours was there too. 
(Karmiloff-Smith 1992:50) 
The unconscious metalinguistic knowledge that 
exists at Explicit-llevel is the inevitable product of the 
internal operations of the mind; without it, creative 
language use, in the Chomskyan sense, would be 
impossible. By contrast, although metalinguistic 
knowledge at Explicit-2 and Explicit-3 levels is to an 
indeterminate degree continuous with that at Explicit-
1level, the closer we come to verbalizable knowledge, 
the greater the likelehood that it derives from external 
as well as internal sources. For example, parents, 
siblings and caregivers may talk to children about 
language in many different ways, and from this 
children can derive folk theories about linguistic form 
and process which supplement their own intuitions. 
More generally, the species-specific mechanisms of 
first language acquisition are activated and fed by 
the child's interaction with others, so that the operation 
of universal biological processes is constrained and 
coloured by an almost infinite variety of historical, 
social and cultural factors. 
Metalinguistic knowledge and the development 
of literacy 
Wells (1981:240£) distinguishes three major 
phases in the child's linguistic development. In the first 
phase, "language functions first and foremost as a 
means for the regulation of activity and interaction"; in 
the second phase "the child gradually takes over the 
language of his community and, in the process, absorbs 
the cultural values and working assumptions that are 
encoded in that particular community's use of 
language"; and in the third phase "the function that 
language performs of representing the objects and 
events of experience is drawn upon to provide a 'tool 
for thinking'· and a means of communicating to others 
the results of the thinking process". For most children 
growing up in western societies, this third phase of 
linguistic development is closely bound up with 
schooling and the acquisition of literacy. 
The written language has developed its own 
characteristic functions, which according to some 
scholars en tail "psychological changes, altered forms of 
representation and forms of consciousness" (Olson 
1991:149). Thus Goody has argued that "it was the 
setting down of speech that enabled man clearly to 
separate words, to manipulate their order and to 
develop syllogistic forms of reasoning" (1977:11), 
and that "writing presents us with an instrument 
capable of transforming our intellectual operations 
from the inside; it is not simply a question of a skill 
in the limiting sense but a change of capacity" 
(1986:255). This concern with the effect of literacy on 
cognitive functioning can be traced back to Vygotsky's 
argument that "the acquisition of literacy automatically 
results in an increased decontextualization of 
mediational means" (Wertsch 1985:36). Luria and 
Vygotsky found, for example, that literacy affected the 
way in which subjects categorized familiar objects: 
literate subjects "grouped objects on the basis of 
abstract word meanings", whereas nonliterate subjects 
"indicated a strong tendency to group items on the 
basis of concrete settings with which they were 
familiar'' (ibid., p. 34). 
Arguments such as these can easily give the 
impression that there is an essential discontinuity 
between early language development and the 
acquisition of literacy. This is very far from being the 
case, however. Learning to read and write depends on 
analytical processes- both conscious and unconscious 
- which would be inconceivable without the 
developing metalinguistic knowledge which, as 
Karmiloff-Smith proposes, is an involuntary part of 
first language acquisition. What is more, Wells found 
that educational success is determined by the place 
given to literacy and the value ·attached to it in the 
child's early experience (1981:259), and that the best 
predictor of attainment in literacy is the "extent of 
children's own understanding of the purposes and 
mechanics of literacy" when they start school (ibid., 
p. 263). 
If the acquisition of literacy depends on the prior 
development of (mostly) unconscious metalinguistic 
knowledge, it also has the power to greatly enhance the 
learner's unconscious but also conscious metalinguistic 
knowledge. The fact that it does not do so automatically 
and invariably means that the way in which literacy is 
developed and the educational uses to which it is 
then put remain fundamental issues for theorists of 
schooling in general amd mother tongue education 
in particular. 
Wells (1981:253) suggests that when we talk 
about the effect of literacy on cognitive functioning, it is 
necessary to distinguish between reading and writing. 
He argues that, complex though the process of reading 
undeniably is, "it is particularly in the creation of 
written text that the individual is made most aware of 
the symbolising function of language" (ibid., p. 254; 
for a similar conclusion, see Hildyard and Hidi 
1985:303). It is important to notice, however, that this 
awareness of the symbolising function oflanguage may 
have much in common with Karmiloff-Smith's 
Explicit-1level of knowledge, since it is not necessarily 
conscious, analytical and self-referential. It is also 
important to notice, as Wells points out, that it "is not 
literacy, as such, [ ... ] that is of such significance, 
but rather the symbolic manipulation of experience 
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through the sort of language which is most 
characteristic of written text" (ibid., p. 255). In other 
words, certain forms of spoken language are also apt to 
make the same demands and have the same effect as the 
creation of those kinds of written text that Wells 
associates with higher levels of cognitive functioning. 
How, then, are we to promote the growth of 
higher cognitive functions within mother tongue 
education? Donaldson's answer to the question 
requires the development of that capacity for 
"detachment, critical reflection, decision-making, and 
independent action" which I associated with learner 
autonomy at the beginning of this article: 
What is going to be required for success in 
our educational system is that [the child] should 
learn to turn language and thought in upon 
themselves. He must become able to direct his 
own thought processes in a thoughtful manner. 
He must become able not just to talk but to 
choose what he will say, not just to interpret 
but to weigh possible interpretations. His 
conceptual system must expand in the direction 
of increasing ability to represent itself. 
(Donaldson 1978:88£) 
In a similar vein, Astington (1994:183) points out 
that in traditional systems of schooling, children do not 
have to think about their thinking, whereas in 
progressive systems they are thought of as constructing 
their knowledge and thus needing to think about their 
thinking. She argues in favour of progressive systems 
on the ground that in their cognitive functioning 
human beings are naturally "second-order systems": 
First-order systems have mental states, 
they have beliefs, desires, and intentions, as do 
second-order systems. However, beyond that, 
second-order systems have concepts of these 
mental states, they have beliefs, and they can 
attribute beliefs and other mental states to 
themselves and others. 
(Astington 1994:183£) 
Arguments of this kind declare the need for a 
pedagogy that develops learners' literacy on the basis 
of their large! y unconscious metalinguistic knowledge, 
but goes on to engage them in tasks that require a high 
degree of conscious analysis. The role of the teacher in 
such a pedagogy is to support learners as they develop 
the capacity to deal with ever more demanding tasks, 
identifying the limits of learners' present capacity 
and facilitating further growth by focussing attention 
on the "zone of proximal development'', to borrow 
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Vygotsky's celebrated notion (see especially Vygotsky 
1978:79-9l).Ageneralsenseofhowthissupportmaybe 
articulated is provided by Bruner's description of 
the effective tutoring of young children: 
To begin with, it was [the tutor] who 
controlled the focus of attention. It was she who, 
by slow and often dramatized presentation, 
demonstrated the task to be possible. She was 
the one with a monopoly on foresight. She kept 
the segments of the task on which the child 
worked to a size and complexity appropriate to 
the child's powers. She set things up in such a 
way that the child could recognize a solution 
and perform it later even though the child could 
neither do it on his own nor follow the solution 
when it was simply told to him. In this respect, 
she made capital out of the "zone" that exists 
between what people can recognize or 
comprehend when present before them, and 
what they can generate on their own [ .. .). In 
general what the tutor did was what the child 
could not do. For the rest, she made things such 
that the child could do with her what he plainly 
could not do without her. And as the tutoring 
proceeded, the child took over from her parts of 
the task that he was not able to do at first but, 
with mastery, 'became consciously able to do 
under his own control. And she gladly handed 
these over. 
(Bruner 1986:75£) 
Note that in this account the gradual handing 
over of control to the learner - in other words, the 
development of learner autonomy- is not an option 
that the tutor may or may not adopt according to 
ideological preference: it is essential to the success of 
the tutoring process. Note also that the handing over of 
control to the learner is more than a psychological 
phenomenon. In order to gain the psychological 
benefits of successful learning, the learner must 
gradually assume control of the social interaction that 
gives outward form and substance to the learning 
process. Once more we are reminded that the social and 
psychological dimensions of learning are inseparable. 
When we are concerned with the development 
of literacy via the performance of writing tasks that 
require increasingly high degrees of conscious analysis, 
pedagogical support must inevitably focus not only on 
the process by which the tasks are performed, but also 
on an analytical understanding of the linguistic 
resources at the learner's disposal. This understanding 
comprises elements of metalinguistic knowledge 
derived from the theories of language and literacy 
current in the society of which the learner is a member. 
At the same time, as the learner's skill in task 
performance develops, so too will that metalinguistic 
knowledge that grows as it were from the inside out, 
as an involuntary part of every individual's 
linguistic development. The interface between these 
two kinds of metalinguistic knowledge, the one 
conscious and external, the other largely unconscious 
and internal, is problematic. In some respects it 
seems certain that there is continuity between them, 
whereas in others there may well be discontinuity. 
But such problematicity is beside the point as far as 
pedagogical procedures are concerned: it is enough 
that an analytical focus (metalinguistic knowledge 
from the outside) provided an indispensable 
scaffolding for the performance of tasks that gradually 
generate a skill, one of whose components is 
metalinguistic knowledge of the internal, largely 
unconscious variety. 
The argument of this section of the article applies 
to mother tongue education understood as that part of 
the curriculum specifically concerned with the 
development of learners' linguistic skills. But it applies 
with equal force to mother tongue education 
understood as all those parts of the curriculum 
mediated through the mother tongue. For as Bruner 
has pointed out, 
the language of education, if it is to be an 
invitation to reflection and culture creating, 
cannot be the so-called uncontaminated 
language of fact and "objectivity". It must 
express stance and must invite counter-stance 
and in the process leave place for reflection, for 
metacognition.lt is this that permits one to reach 
higher ground, this process of objectifying in 
language or image what one has thought and 
then turning around on it and reconsidering it. 
(Bruner 1986:129) 
In the light of this argument, it is hardly 
surprising that for Bruner the goal of all education is 
what I have defined as learner autonomy: 
If [the learner] fails to develop any sense 
of what I shall call reflective intervention in the 
knowledge he encounters, the young person will 
be operating continually from the outside in-
knowledge will control and guide him. If he 
succeeds in developing such a sense, he will 
control and select knowledge as needed. If he 
develops a sense of self that is premised on his 
ability to penetrate knowledge for his own uses, 
and if he can share and negotiate the result of his 
penetrations, then he becomes a member of the 
culture-creating community. 
(Bruner 1986:132) 
Learner autonomy and metalinguistic knowledge 
in second/foreign language learning 
In general, then, if we want our educational 
systems to develop learners' higher cognitive 
functions, we must adopt a pedagogy that makes it 
possible for teachers to support learners in the "zone of 
proximal development". In order to achieve its 
cognitive goals, such a pedagogy must possess certain 
social characteristics. Specifically, it must be organized 
in such a way as to allow the teacher to give regular and 
close attention to individual learners, and its discourse 
structures must allow the free negotiation of meaning, 
the sharing of power, and the gradual transfer of 
control from the teacher to the learners. 
Tharp and Gallimore (1988) provide a full 
account of the theoretical (Vygotskyan) foundation and 
practical application of just such a pedagogy. In their 
project, primary classes were divided into groups of 
five or six learners, which rotated around a number of 
different activity centres, one of which was controlled 
by the teacher. This procedure had two closely related 
benefits: it allowed the teacher to interact in a focussed 
and concentrated way with five or six learners at a time, 
and it required those learners who were not working 
with the teacher to discover how to conduct learning 
conversations among themselves, supporting one 
another in the zone of proximal development. 
Naturally, these learning conversations were likely to 
derive some of their principal characteristics from the 
conversations controlled by the teacher. 
The successful implementation of such a 
pedagogy for mother tongue education (whether 
understood in its narrower or its broader sense) will 
create expectations and capacities in our learners that 
should be transferrable to the learning of second/ 
foreign languages. In particular, learners who are 
familiar from mother tongue education with the 
structures, requirements and processes of group work 
bring to the second/foreign language classroom a 
ready-made framework for the development of 
proficiency via target language use. But what about the 
analytical skills and metalinguistic knowledge that 
learners have developed as part of their growing 
literacy in their mother tongue? 
I have argued in relation to the development 
of mother tongue literacy that it is necessary to 
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distinguish between two kinds of metalinguistic 
knowledge that which grows as it were from the 
inside out as an inevitable part of expanding linguistic 
competence, and that which derives from theories of 
language and literacy current in the society of which 
the learner is a member. I have also argued that the 
interface between these two kinds of metalinguistic 
knowledge is problematic, but essentially irrelevant to 
our pedagogical concerns. Paradis (1994) makes the 
same point in relation. to second/foreign language 
learning, insisting that "metalinguistic knowledge 
formally learned in school, is not integrated into 
linguistic competence and does not become available 
for automatic use' (p. 393). He goes on: 
This does not mean that metalinguistic 
knowledge cannot be useful in the process of 
learning another language, whether by focusing 
attention on some aspect of the linguistic data 
that would otherwise have gone unnoticed, or 
by allowing one to check one's output, or to 
deduce who does what to whom through a 
conscious identification of case markers, and 
thereby improving one's practice. But it is the 
practice, not the metalinguistic knowledge, 
which improves automatic performance (and by 
implication, linguistic competence) 
(ibid., p. 405) 
In second/ foreign language learning as in 
mother tongue education, then, metalinguistic 
knowledge can provide learners with a basis for 
analysing their performance, reflecting on the learning 
process, setting learning goals, and choosing particular 
learning strategies. In other words, it can provide a 
stimulus and framework for the performance of tasks 
calculated to develop proficiency, even though it 
cannot itself become part of that proficiency. 
There is, however, an obvious and important 
difference between second/ foreign language learning 
and the development of mother tongue literacy skills. 
Vygotsky (1986:159) puts it thus: 
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It is well known that to learn a foreign 
language at school and to develop one's native 
language involve two entirely different 
processes. While learning a foreign language, 
we use word meanings that are already well 
developed in the native language, and only 
translate them; the advanced knowledge of 
one's own language also plays an important role 
in the study of the foreign one, as well as those 
inner and outer relations that are characteristic 
only in the study of a foreign language. 
In terms of the central concerns of this article, we 
can expand Vygotsky' s point by saying that whereas in 
our first language we develop proficiency and 
unconscious metalinguistic knowledge before we 
develop conscious metalinguistic knowledge, from the 
beginning of second/foreign language learning we 
can bring a measure of conscious metalinguistic 
knowledge to bear on the learning task. This fact has an 
important corollary: whereas in our first language 
literacy is acquired on the basis of a developed oral 
proficiency, in second and foreign language learning 
we can in principle learn literacy in advance of oral 
proficiency. 
Second and foreign language pedagogy has 
always used the technology of writing to support 
learning - for example, learners have traditionally 
compiled lists of the vocabulary they need to master, 
and have been encouraged to write down grammatical 
rules and examples of their application. There are, 
moreover, many educational systems that produce 
learners whose second or foreign language writing 
skills are better developed than their oral skills. This is 
not surprising, since in most circumstances writing is 
less "immediate" than speaking, and thus permits a 
higher degree of "off-line" processing. But the fact that 
the social and psychological dimensions of learning are 
so strongly interdependent should encourage us to 
seek ways of exploiting the early development of 
creative writing skills in the second or foreign language 
to support the development of oral skills. For example, 
if a class of learners is given a writing task- perhaps a 
brief description of themselves and their interests -
preparatory whole-class discussion, including analysis 
of the linguistic resources needed to perform the task, 
embeds the individual act of writing in a con text of oral 
and social interaction, while the writing process itself 
inevitably maintains an analytical focus on the words 
and structures each· individual learner decides to 
employ. The texts that the learners produce can then be 
used as the basis for further interactive oral tasks- they 
can be shared with other learners, and they can serve to 
prompt oral self-descriptions and discussion. In turn 
these oral activities can feed into further writing 
activities, and so on. In this way, it is possible to 
establish a chain of learning tasks in which writing 
interacts with speaking and the use and further 
development of "external" metalinguistic knowledge 
interacts with the use and gradual growth of 
proficiency, including the development of "internal" 
metalinguistic knowledge (for a sustained example 
of this approach in practice, see Dam 1995). 
Of course, we may expect that learning a foreign 
language has an impact on the learner's awareness of 
his or her mother tongue. Vygotsky (1986:195f.) makes 
the point as follows: 
Success in learning a fOl'eign language is 
contingent on a certain degree of maturity in the 
native language. The child can transfer to the 
new language the system of meanings he 
already possesses in his own. The reverse is also 
true- a foreign language facilitates mastering 
the higher forms of the native language. The 
child learns to see his language as one particular 
system among many, to view its phenomena 
under more general categories, and this leads to 
awareness of his linguistic operations. 
This reciprocal - or "dialogic" (Bialystok and 
Hakuta 1994:184)- relation between first and second/ 
forefgn language learning turns upon the role 
played in either case by both unconscious and 
conscious metalinguistic knowledge. It must be 
emphasized, however, that the full potential of this 
"dialogic" relation between first and second/foreign 
langti!age learning will not be realized spontaneously: 
its effect inevitably depends on the development of 
a critical pedagogy focussed socially and cognitively 
on the growth of learner autonomy. 
Conclusion 
I began this article by proposing that learner 
autonomy is sustained and strengthened by a 
developing capacity for "detachment, critical 
reflection, decision-making, and independent action". 
While arguing that the social and psychological 
dimensions of learning are ultimately inseparable, 
I associated the capacity for critical reflection and 
analysis with the psychological dimension, and 
identified metalinguistic knowledge as a central 
component of that capacity. 
I followed Karmiloff-Smith in arguing that the 
growth of metalinguistic knowledge "from the inside 
out'' is an essential part of first language acquisition; 
but I went on to argue that explicit, verbalizable 
metalinguistic knowledge may also 'Je derived from 
sources external to the learner, for example, the theories 
about language and literacy that .:rre current in the 
society of which he or she is a member. I then 
considered the role of metalinguistic knowledge in the 
development of mother tongue literacy, suggesting 
that the acquisition of literacy depends in the first 
place on largely unconscious, "developmental" 
metalinguistic knowledge, but that the exploitation of 
literacy with a view to developing higher cognitive 
functions depends on analytical processes that both 
presuppose and promote the further growth of explicit 
and (at least in part) externally derived metalinguistic 
knowledge. Turning my attention to the role of 
metalinguistic knowledge in second/ foreign language 
learning, I followed Paradis in arguing that although 
externally derived metalinguistic knowledge cannot 
be converted into the "internal" metalinguistic 
knowledge that is part of proficiency, it can be used to 
stimulate, frame, focus and monitor the language use 
that does promote growth in proficiency, and thus in 
"internal" metalinguistic knowledge. I illustrated this 
point with an example that showed how literacy skills 
can be used in the earliest stages of second/ foreign 
language learning to help develop oral proficiency. 
Finally, I noted that second/foreign language learning 
necessarily has an impact on the learner's awareness of 
his or her mother tongue. Those parts of my argument 
that have to do with formal education carry important 
implications for the social organization of learning, 
especially as regards power and control. This fact 
should lead us to see learner autonomy, defined as "the 
ability to take charge of one's learning", not as an 
optional extra but as a prerequisite of successful 
learning. It has been the purpose of this article to 
suggest that we shall achieve the full effect of learner 
autonomy in second/foreign language classrooms 
only when it is also an explicit and central goal of our 
mother tongue pedagogy: if the social and 
psychological dimensions of learning are ultimately 
inseparable, so too are the cognitive effects of first, 
second and foreign language learning. 
Note: I am grateful to my colleagues Jennifer Ridley and Ema 
Ushioda for helpful comments on the first draft of this article. 
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